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References to a “New North” have snowballed across popular media in the past
10 years. By invoking the phrase, scientists, policy analysts, journalists and oth-
ers draw attention to the collision of global warming and global investment in
the Arctic today and project a variety of futures for the region and the planet.
While changes are apparent, the trope of a “New North” is not new. Discourses
that appraised unfamiliar situations at the top of the world have recurred
throughout the twentieth century. They have also accompanied attempts to
cajole, conquer, civilize, consume, conserve and capitalize upon the far north.
This article examines these politics of the “New North” by critically reading
“New North” texts from the North American Arctic between 1910 and 2010. In
each case, appeals to novelty drew from evaluations of the historical record and
assessments of the Arctic’s shifting position in global affairs. “New North”
authors pinpointed the ways science, state power, capital and technology trans-
formed northern landscapes at different moments in time. They also licensed
political and corporate inﬂuence in the region by delimiting the colonial legacies
already apparent there. Given these tendencies, scholars need to approach the
most recent iteration of the “New North” carefully without concealing or repeat-
ing the most troubling aspects of the Arctic’s past.
Keywords: Arctic regions; New North; Yukon Territory; Northwest Territories;
Alaska; history; geography; science; frontier
The riches of the world’s last virgin territory have spurred the reawakening of old
geopolitical rivalries The USA, Canada, Russia, Norway and the Danish territory of
Greenland all control areas around the Arctic Ocean. We face a new era of oil rigs
and drill ships, of tankers taking shortcuts from Yokohama to Rotterdam, as well as a
potential ﬁght over the Arctic’s treasures.
(Jacket description of research biologist Alun Anderson’s, After the Ice: Life, Death,
and Geopolitics in the New Arctic, 2012.)
If the north of the future does in fact turn into anything like I have suggested, how
will it look? … Scattered communities – some a thousand or two in population, others
ten or ﬁfteen thousand – grown up around mines of all kinds. They will be linked to
the south or to seaboard by road or rail in most cases, but some will probably depend
on large and efﬁcient aircraft.
*Email: stuhl@wisc.edu
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(Commissioner of the Northwest Territories Gordon Robertson, “The Future of the North”
speech, given as part of the “New North” lecture series at Carleton University, 1957.)
Narrative succeeds to the extent that it hides the discontinuities, ellipses and
contradictory experiences that would undermine the intended meaning of its story.
(Historian William Cronon, “A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative,”
1992.1)
Introduction: a New North?
References to a “New North” have snowballed across popular media in the past 10
years. Independent journalists Gwynne Dyer, Bob Reiss and McKenzie Funk;
policy analyst and risk-assessment expert Charles Emmerson; geographer Laurence
C. Smith; and research biologist Alun Anderson – to name a few – have cited vul-
nerabilities in Arctic landscapes and communities, strains on international relations,
and booms in global mineral and energy markets to declare an unprecedented
moment in the circumpolar region.2 Blending evaluations of current conditions with
war-game scenario planning, these authors sensationalize the collision of global
warming and global investment at the top of the world in order to project a variety
of futures for the Arctic and the planet.
While changes are apparent, the New North is not new. Since the early 1900s,
discourses and practices that appraised unfamiliar situations in the Arctic have
accompanied attempts to cajole, conquer, civilize, consume, conserve and capitalize
upon the far north. Robertson’s vision for the Canadian Arctic, for example, coin-
cided with his efforts as Commissioner of the Northwest Territories under Prime
Minister Diefenbaker’s “Road to Resources” programme to expand resource devel-
opment schemes, social welfare programmes and defence structures across the north
in the late 1950s.3 This is not merely a coincidence, but part of the nature of the
New North itself.
1Alun Anderson, After the Ice: Life, Death, and Geopolitics in the New Arctic (HarperCol-
lins, 2009). Description available from http://www.amazon.com/After-Ice-Geopolitics-Arctic-
ebook/dp/B002WKSNZU (accessed December 14, 2012); R.G. Robertson, “The Future of
the North,” a speech given before Carleton University, 1957, “Northern Development”
folder, Dick Hill Collection, Inuvik Centennial Library, Inuvik, Northwest Territories; Wil-
liam Cronon, “A Place for Stories: Nature, History, and Narrative,” Journal of American
History, (March, 1992), 1349–50.
2Gwynne Dyer, Climate Wars: The Fight for Survival as the World Overheats (Oneworld),
2011; Bob Reiss, The Eskimo and the OilMan: The Battle at the Top of the World for Amer-
ica’s Future (Business Plus, 2012); McKenzie Funk, “Cold Rush: The Coming Fight for the
Melting North,” Harper’s Magazine, (September, 2007), 45–55; Charles Emmerson, The
Future History of the Arctic (Public Affairs, 2010); Laurence C. Smith, The New North: The
World in 2050 (Proﬁle Books, 2011); Anderson, After the Ice.
3Matthew Farish, “Frontier Engineering: From the Globe to the Body in the Cold War
Arctic,” The Canadian Geographer 50, no. 2 (2006), 177–96; See Matthew Farish and
P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “High Modernism in the Arctic: Planning Frobisher Bay and
Inuvik,”Journal of Historical Geography 35 (2009), 517–44; Frank Tester and Peter
Kulchyski, Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocation in the Eastern Arctic, 1939–1963
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994).
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The phrase, like the larger arguments in which it is enrolled, packs its rhetorical
punch not simply by compiling the facts of contemporary Arctic matters, but by
arranging them in relation to the historical record. In Anderson’s formation, geopo-
litical rivalries among northern nations are “old” because they echo the scramble to
claim the North Pole and any remaining Polar islands in the ﬁrst three decades of
the twentieth century. A gesture to a “new era of oil rigs and drill ships” renders
existing incarnations of the petroleum industry in the Arctic irrelevant or invisible
(recall, for example, the oil strikes at Prudhoe Bay in 1968, or the crossing of the
Northwest Passage by the S.S. Manhattan in 1969). Moreover, the word being
modiﬁed – North – is as important as the modiﬁer. Statements about change in Arc-
tic were never absolute, but relative: the circumpolar region was different because
its interrelations with other places had been restructured. The New North is thus
both less and more than it seems: on one hand, a regular feature in colonialism’s
Arctic history and, on the other, a means of reinterpreting that history to make
truth-claims about the world.
In this essay, I propose to re-frame New North stories as a historical genre of
Arctic writing so scholars can situate the jarring changes unfolding in the Arctic
today – and the avalanche of print responding to them – in a broader perspective of
change over the twentieth century. A review of a series of New North texts from
1910 to 2010 demonstrates both the recurring discourse and its persistent elements.
Looking closely at the circulation of literature relevant to the region I know best –
the Western Arctic of Alaska, Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories – we
see how capital, statecraft, science and technology shaped northern life and ideas
about it.4 While my survey is limited, it nevertheless reveals an important point:
proclamations about the north and associated evaluations of history and geography
often licensed political and corporate inﬂuence while delimiting the colonial lega-
cies already apparent in the north.5 Given these tendencies, scholars need to
approach melting sea ice, thawing permafrost and unpredictable weather patterns
carefully, identifying clearly what it is “new” about the human responses to these
changes without covering over (or repeating) the most troubling aspects of northern
history.
Before moving forward, I should note two caveats. First, I do not intend to sug-
gest that modern-day New North stories are part of some vicious neocolonial
power-play. I do want to argue, as William Cronon has, that these stories have been
and continue to be mechanisms for structuring the human relationship with the
Arctic.6 Ultimately, it behoves scholars to take seriously both the overt and covert
exercises of power inherent in continually imagining the shape of Arctic futures by
reading its past. Second, while scholars have not directly treated the New North
formation, they have made possible this investigation through scholarship on the
concept of the “north”, the “frontier” more broadly, and the bonds between history
4This region forms the center of my broader dissertation project, a history of science and
environmental change in the Arctic. As part of this research, I spent 10months living in Inu-
vik, Northwest Territories. I also have traveled throughout northern Alaska and northwestern
Canada and spent another 10months living in Inuvik prior to beginning my PhD work.
5Michael Bravo makes a similar claim: that by portraying Inuit as an “at-risk community”
scientists authorized themselves as stewards of lands and resources that did not belong to
them. See Michael Bravo, “Voices from the sea ice: the reception of climate impact narra-
tives,” Journal of Historical Geography, 35 (2009), 256–78.
6Cronon, 1345–50.
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and the future. Sherrill Grace and Janice Cavell have cogently argued that the idea
of the “North” in Canada reﬂected or projected the region’s relations to metropoli-
tan centres below the Arctic Circle.7 Sverker Sorlin has spoken recently about the
place of the future in Arctic history from a Scandinavian perspective.8 In 2004,
Joseph E. Taylor III analysed an emergent “New West” literature, deeming the trope
“loaded and simplistic” and challenging historians to see change as global, colonial
and historical (neither new nor western in nature).9 More than 20 years ago, Jan
Nederveen Pieterse observed the interpretations of history that act as “panoramas of
power” in development discourse.10 I draw from all of these scholars’ logic and
approaches to examine the politics of the New North.
Five New Norths, 1910–1971
Table 1 presents a list of books and articles containing “New North” or other
similar phrases in their titles. There are six different iterations of the New North
between 1910 and 2010 and all of these touch the Western Arctic in some way.
Surveying these items helps to elucidate a set of persistent elements at work in
shaping Arctic life and the way we think about it. State power, technology, capital-
ism and science have held leading roles in the ﬁrst ﬁve New Norths and, as we will
see in the conclusion, they appear in the most recent iteration. Moreover, the con-
cepts underpinning the two words in “New North” – time and space, or history and
geography – were always enrolled to make sense of environmental and social
change in the Arctic.
The ﬁrst New North began as the Old West closed.11 Just as US and Cana-
dian governments and capitalists had ﬁnished tying the continent together with
railroad, the North seemed to open as a frontier for markets and the pioneering
spirit. Agnes Deans Cameron’s The New North recounts the tale of the ﬁrst white
woman to travel overland to the Arctic Ocean.12 Sponsored by the Western Can-
ada Immigration Association, the British Columbia social-reformer-turned-booster
journalist detailed the prospects awaiting eager settlers in the lands bordering the
Mackenzie River from Fort Smith to Fort McPherson, and beyond.13 From the
beginning, New North authors stressed how technology transformed northern
7Sherrill E. Grace, Canada and the Idea of North (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press), 2001. Janice Cavell, “The Second Frontier: The North in English-Canadian Historical
Writing,” The Canadian Historical Review, 83, no. 3 (September, 2002), 364–89.
8Centre for Environmental History, “Recording of Sverker Sorlin’s lecture, ‘Global Change, His-
tory, and Planetary Futures: Stories from Sweden’s far northern edge’” http://www.ceh.environ-
mentalhistory-au-nz.org/2012/06/recording-of-sverker-sorlins-lecture/ (accessed November 10,
2012).
9Joseph E. Taylor, III, “The Many Lives of the New West,” The Western Historical Quar-
terly, 35, no. 2 (Summer, 2004), 141–65.
10Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Dilemmas of Development Discourse: The Crisis of Develop-
mentalism and the Comparative Method,” Development and Change, 22 (1991), 5–29.
11Aron Senkpiel, “From the Wild West to the Far North – Literary Representations of North
America’s Last Frontier,” in Eric Heyne, ed. Desert, Garden, Margin, Range: Literature on
the American Frontier, (Twayne Publishers), 1992, 135–42.
12Agnes Deans Cameron, The New North: An Account of a Woman’s 1908 Journey through
Canada to the Arctic, edited by David Richeson (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie
Books, 1986).
13Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, “Cameron, Agnes Deans,” http://www.bio-
graphi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?&id_nbr=7262 (accessed November 20, 2012).
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opportunities and experiences. Over the turn of the twentieth century, the technol-
ogies were railroads, steamers and gas-powered schooners; the opportunities
appeared unlimited; and the experiences were settlement. “As Canadians, looking
at this Western Canada which has arrived and thinking of the lands of Canada’s
fertile Northland far beyond,” Cameron wrote, “for the future we are full of opti-
mism, and of the present we are glad”.14
Cameron, like those who would follow her in New North history, emphasized
the economic opportunities of the North American hinterland. She organized her
travelogue spatially, according to her journey from Winnipeg, up through Athabasca
Landing, to the Mackenzie River, and down to the Arctic Ocean. This vantage point
allowed Cameron, and her readers, to note the transition between what she called the
“Belt of Wheat”, with its northern limits around the Peace River, to the “Belt of
Fur”, which extended clear to the Arctic coast.15 At Herschel Island in the Beaufort
Sea, she found, with amazement, the “coming of commerce”, brought around the
horn of Alaska by whalers searching for baleen and whale oil.16 While on the
Mackenzie, Cameron met the President of Northern Transportation Company, JK
Cornwall, who likened the Athabasca-Peace river systems and the timber and wheat
resources found in its watershed to the Mississippi, St. Lawrence, and Great Lakes
regions. Starting a trend that continues today, Cornwall and Cameron promoted this
region as a logical site for investment for capitalists, one that would help fuel
national development, by relating its landscape features to other places known to be
central to the fate of nations. Like the rivers and lakes of the continent’s midsection,
the North, Cameron wrote, “would seem to hold within it all the elements that make
Table 1. “New North” titles from 1910 to 2010. I compiled this list through my research
on histories of science in the Western Arctic (Alaska, Yukon Territory and Northwest
Territories) and through a query of the Library of Congress database. It is not deﬁnitive but
intended to be illustrative of the politics inherent in imagining a “New North”.
Source Author Date
The New North: Being Some Account of a Woman’s Journey
Through Canada to the Arctic
Agnes Deans
Cameron
1910
The Northward Course of Empire Vilhjalmur
Stefansson
1922
“The New North,” Canadian Affairs, 1, no. 3 Trevor Lloyd 1944
“The New North,” Lecture Series at Carleton University Many 1957
“The Future: Man in the North,” Arctic Institute of North America
Conference
Many 1971
The New North: Our World in 2050 Laurence
C. Smith
2010
14Cameron, 302. Cameron directly noted the role of technology in empire: “But the day of
our great men is not over; Canada still in her great North and West has Pathﬁnders of
Empire. The early voyageurs made their quest in the dugout and the birch bark; and the
tools of these are rails of steel and iron horses.” 292.
15Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, “Cameron, Agnes Deans”.
16Cameron, 175. Interestingly, she paid scant attention to potential mineral industries, despite
her proximity to the Klondike region and the magnetic appeal of gold in drawing southern-
ers northward in the 1890s. On the Klondike Gold Rush and notions of the North, see
Grace, 68 and 93–120.
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for national greatness: the richest soil in the world, oil, timber, fur, ﬁsh, great under-
lying coal measures, [and] a hinterland which is a very Pandora’s box of gifts”.17
In one sense, Cameron might have only repeated what British naval ofﬁcers and
Hudson’s Bay Company scouts had done centuries before. But, the early 1900s was
not like earlier periods, despite the continued use of the Mackenzie River as an
artery for reconnaissance missions. To the young Canadian woman, the North’s
longest waterway was not a conduit of British Empire, but a monument to its check-
ered past. Passing through Point Separation – one of the many markers of British
attempts to claim northern terrain – Cameron recounted the story of John Richard-
son, who returned this spot where the Mackenzie River splits to leave a cairn in
memory of the lost Franklin expeditions. While at Fort Good Hope, Cameron heard
of the story of John Bell, who implored chief factors of the Hudson’s Bay Company
in London to supply northern fur outposts with the “large white beads” demanded
by native traders. When higher-ups did not meet Bell’s request, Dene and Inuit
refused to sell meat to post operators. Many of these European men and their fami-
lies subsequently died from starvation.18 If military and commercial agents failed to
conquer the North and the Northwest Passage, this did not mean the Arctic remained
outside the orbit of colonial power. Indeed, by the time Cameron arrived, the scien-
tiﬁc project that Franklin, Richardson, Mackenzie and Hearne pursued on their jour-
neys, northward – classifying and enumerating the vast unknown – seemed to have
been completed, if not passe. In exhaustion, she wrote,
You cannot ﬁnd a ﬂower nowadays that someone has not tacked a Latin name to, and
it goes by inverse ratio – the smaller the ﬂower the longer the name. Every bird you
hear sing, even though it stop but an hour to rest its tired pinion on its northern
migration has an invisible label pinned under its coat.19
Cameron invoked northern North America’s British history as a counterpoint to
her imaginary of a New North, one marked by US and Canadian settlement and
development. Where geography textbooks and explorer’s notebooks had portrayed
Inuit as a “short, squat, dirty man who lives on blubber”, Cameron described Inuit
as friendly, cheerful and honest in business practices. They were citizen-subjects
who could play leading roles in twentieth-century northern commerce. Looking for
the “Old North” of a hostile Arctic at Herschel Island, just off the coast of the inter-
national boundary between Alaska and Yukon Territory, Cameron instead found a
hub of trading activity, a welcome sign of an economic frontier.20 She noted the
presence of Portuguese, Danish and American whalers; Royal Canadian Mounted
Police; European missionaries; and at least four native communities – Gwich’in Indi-
ans, Alaskan coastal Inuit, Mackenzie Delta Inuit and Alaskan interior Inuit.
Contrary to nineteenth-century explorer-naturalists, the real issue for Cameron was
17Cameron, 282–3. For an insightful reading of Cameron against the writings of Warburton
Pike, see Elizabeth Jonquil Covello, “The Northwest Territories Reconstruction Project: Tell-
ing Our Stories,” (PhD Diss., University of British Columbia, 2009), especially 112–62.
Covello concludes that Cameron’s text, while “contributing early knowledge of the indige-
nous people, [was] instrumental in framing an imaginary north that assumed hegemonic sta-
tus over the geographical and cultural north that already existed.” ii.
18On Point Separation, see Cameron, 200–2. On John Bell and Fort Good Hope, see
Cameron, 237–9.
19Cameron, 165–78. Quote from 210–1.
20Ibid., 164; 211–6.
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not establishing the northern rim as a passageway to Asian markets, or skinning the
tundra for London fashionistas, but creating linkages between the Arctic, Ottawa and
the US’s growing Paciﬁc empire. Both Canadian and British political leaders had
feared the “Americanization” of the Provincial and Territorial norths, but Cameron
saw foreign interests in the regions as sources for North American power.21 The ﬁrst
New North was more globalized than any previous North. Yet despite the changes of
industrial capitalism, the period’s market-oriented and imperial rhetoric was an adap-
tation of old interests to evolving commercial and political exchanges.
Historians might be most familiar with the next New North, signalled by Vilh-
jalmur Stefansson’s 1922 book, The Northward Course of Empire. Here, the self-
proclaimed “Prophet of the North” sought to catalyze the comprehensive develop-
ment of the Arctic by dispelling once and for all the misguided notion of the North
as Frozen Wasteland.22 A Harvard-trained anthropologist, Stefansson could claim
some expertise in Arctic matters – he had spent a dozen years in the Western Arctic
on three different scientiﬁc expeditions in search of a supposed “Polar Continent”
off the north slope of Alaska; valuable copper deposits in the Coronation Gulf and
Bathurst Inlet regions; traces of so-called “uncontaminated” native peoples (the infa-
mous “Blonde Eskimo”) and muskox, that bison of the Arctic.23 Lost islands,
potential mother lodes, never-before-seen peoples and other endangered species
were markers of an early twentieth-century zeitgeist, the same period that witnessed
the Scramble for Africa and the Race to the Poles. Stefansson saw the tundra as
desirable country, which, like the West, could be transformed from desert to garden
by pioneering citizens and interested companies who understood it was not perpetu-
ally dark and cold. But, he also railed against the ways the whaling industry had
corrupted Inuit culture and decimated Arctic caribou populations.24 Pursuing devel-
21Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, “Cameron, Agnes Deans.” Cameron wrote,
“The Americanisation of Canada? During the past seven years over three hundred and ﬁfty
thousand people have come to us from the United States. Is this American invasion to be
feared politically? Western Canada has no more desirable citizens than those who come to
us from the south … The troubled English brother should remember that when ‘American’
farmers in Canada pronounce on Canadian matters they do so constitutionally at the polls
and as Canadian citizens … Is Canada Loyal to England?” is a question that sometimes
meets us. No, Canada is loyal to the British Empire of which she forms a part. Let England
see to it that she, too, is loyal.” Cameron, 298–9.
22On Stefansson as the “Prophet of the North,” see David C. Nutt, “Stef at Dartmouth,” Polar
Notes: Occasional Publication of the Stefansson Collection, no. IV (November, 1962), 33.
23On Stefansson’s tenure as an Arctic explorer, and the concerns that propelled it see Trevor
H. Levere, Science and the Canadian Arctic: A Century of Exploration, 1818–1918,
(New York: University of Cambridge Press, 1993), 390–417; or any of his biographies:
D. LeBourdais, Stefansson: Ambassador of the North, (Montreal, 1963); William Hunt, Stef:
A Biography of Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Canadian Arctic Explorer, (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 1986); Richard Diubaldo, Stefansson and the Canadian Arctic,
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1978); and Gisli Palsson, Traveling Passions:
The Hidden Life of Vilhjalmur Stefansson, (Hanover: Dartmouth College Press, 2003). Or
his own autobiography: Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Discovery: The Autobiography of Vilhjalmur
Stefansson, (New York: McGraw Hill Publishers, 1964).
24Stefansson’s ideas about the desirability of northern country and the effects of the whaling
industry on Inuit life are found in his books, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, My Life with the
Eskimo, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1913), Vilhjalmur Stefansson, The Friendly
Arctic: The Story of Five Years in Polar Regions (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1921);
and Vilhjalmur Stefansson, The Northward Course of Empire, (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and Company, 1922).
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opment and conservation of natural and cultural resources at the same time required
technologies both old and new. Domesticated muskox and imported reindeer could
convert mosses and lichens into meat products for local and national markets. Car-
ing for these animals also turned Inuit hunters into herders, helping ease a transition
to modernity that was sure to come through aeroplanes, submarines and the boom
of Arctic mining.25
Stefansson’s attempts to redeﬁne the Arctic mediated post-First World War
political and cultural concerns about food scarcity and industrialization in North
America. As western ranches gave way to settlement, European agricultural ﬁelds
recovered from the wounds of battle, and urban populations exploded, the North
appeared as both a promising economic frontier and a romantic escape from civiliza-
tion.26 Like Cameron, Stefansson framed the opportunities in the North in the spa-
tial terms of a region. But, rather than pointing to the St. Lawrence or the
Mississippi – the channels of New World might – he called on a more historic and
perhaps more commanding imaginary: the Arctic was a “Polar Mediterranean”.
“Most of us will get a wider view of the commercial, political, and military future
of the world”, he charged, “when we realize that the aeroplane, the dirigible, and
the submarine are about to turn the polar ocean into a Mediterranean and about to
make England and Japan, Norway and Alaska, neighbors across the northern
sea”.27
Stefansson’s gesture to the Mediterranean was intended as a call to action to his
readers in the USA and Canada: which country in North America would build the
ﬁrst Arctic Roman Empire? A tireless promoter Stefansson, lobbied bureaucrats in
Ottawa and Washington, the Lomen Corporation of Alaska, and the Hudson’s Bay
Company to explore, exploit and colonize the Arctic, suggesting to each that
sovereign claims to the region were not yet settled.28 Meanwhile, the commercial
whaling industry that startled Agnes Deans Cameron had collapsed by this time,
leaving its legacy in Inuit populations crushed by disease, a general migration of
Alaskan Inupiat into the Mackenzie Delta, and the expansion of the fur trade to the
coast and Arctic islands (Victoria and Banks) by surviving Inuvialuit who inherited
schooners and the English language from their whaling captain partners.29 While
25Stefansson, The Northward Course of Empire, 42–64.
26On food scarcity issues spawned by the war, see Stefansson, Northward Course of Empire,
64 and 135. On the north as an escape from civilization in the inter-war period, see Christina
Adcock, “Many tiny traces: Antimodern anxieties and colonial intimacies in the Canadian
North,” Network in Canadian History and Environment, http://www.niche-canada.org/node/
10088 (accessed October 9, 2012).
27Stefansson, Northward Course of Empire, 178.
28Ibid. See also Janice Cavell and Jeff Noakes, Acts of Occupation: Canada and Arctic
Sovereignty, 1918–1925 (Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2010).
29These details come from Canadian Museum of Civilization, “Northern People, Northern
Knowledge: The Canadian Arctic Expedition of 1913–1918, by David Gray,” http://www.
civilization.ca/cmc/exhibitions/hist/cae/indexe.shtml (accessed December 20, 2011. This web-
site is an incredible resource for scholars interested in the history and impact of the Cana-
dian Arctic Expedition. Gray has performed archival and ﬁeld research to detail the
expedition, consulting published reports, correspondence, and ﬁeld diaries of many of the
members. He has also visited regions of the Western Arctic to interview family members of
the Inuit participants of the expedition. See also, Albert Elias and Charles Arnold, “The
Schooner Era in Twentieth Century Inuvialuit History,” a Presentation before the 18th Inuit
Studies Conference, October 26, 2012.
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Stefansson largely ignored the ways Inuit continued to adapt and thrive in the
North, his writing animated – and was animated by – particular sensibilities about
truth in an era fascinated with satire and debunking myths. Stefansson chafed
against efforts to re-romanticize the Arctic as a primitive foil for an over-civilized
metropolitan society, calling Robert Flaherty’s Nanook of the North as real as Santa
Claus.30 As scholars Janice Cavell, Jeff Noakes, John Sandlos and Tina Adcock
have noted, Stefansson’s arguments not only spurred the extension of Canadian
state power northward in 1920s and 1930s, they also illuminate the cultural con-
cerns that were driving both anti-modernism and the next New North.31
Stefansson’s engagement with the “Old North” went much deeper than Cam-
eron’s. As glimpsed in his reference to the Mediterranean, the anthropologist and
explorer reached back several centuries to situate the Arctic of the 1920s in the
course of history. After connecting dots between Tacitus of Ancient Greece, the
Moors of the Middle Ages and the purchase of Alaska by the USA in 1867, Ste-
fansson concluded that “Men at every period of history have been generally of the
opinion that the ultimate limit of the northward spread of civilization had then at
length been reached”.32 Stefansson presented an opportunity for his readers – the
“average intelligent person who is not a geographer or meteorologist” – to ﬁnally
overcome the burden of history and see the Arctic as livable, full of potential and
yet to be colonized.33 By replacing notions of a barren, desolate, or ice-locked wil-
derness with scientiﬁc knowledge of the tundra, its wildlife and its climate, Stefans-
son sought to prove that there was “no northern boundary beyond which productive
enterprise cannot go till North meets North on the opposite shores of the Arctic
Ocean as East has met West”.34 Indeed, a perspective of the broad sweep of time
seemed to call into question the notion that empire had always proceeded westerly
from Europe to the New World. The title of his book, The Northward Course of
Empire, was thus not his promise, but a pattern of the past: “But it is equally indis-
putable and more signiﬁcant (because it rests on broader natural causes) that north-
ward the course of civilization has been taking its way …”35 Stefansson’s New
North was thus, perhaps ironically, the fulﬁlment of human history.
Above all, Stefansson was controversial. His writings, and the heated debates
they engendered, open a window on the contests of authority latent within every
enunciation of a New North. Stefansson scolded scientists like government zoolo-
gist Rudolph Anderson – who accompanied him in the Arctic between 1908 and
1916 – for losing the “Scientiﬁc spirit” necessary to capitalize upon the north.
“What one needs”, Stefansson said,
is a scientist of the Darwin type … whose mind is open to the truth of every sort. The
scientist in the civil service … is likely to have every other attribute that you would
30Vilhjalmur Stefansson, The Standardization of Error, (New York: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner and Company, 1928), 52–5.
31Cavell and Noakes, Acts of Occupation.; John Sandlos, Hunters at the Margin: Native
People and Wildlife Conservation in the Northwest Territories, (University of British Colum-
bia Press), 2007.
32Stefansson, The Northward Course of Empire, 1.
33Ibid., 250.
34Ibid., 19.
35Ibid., 1.
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expect of a man who arrives at his ofﬁce at 9:15 in the morning and leaves at 4:55 in
the afternoon.36
Anderson fought back. He called Stefansson a “peerless leader” and a sensationalist
who distorted the facts to get seats in auditoriums, not to drive at scientiﬁc truths.
He said the Arctic was “desirable country” only to the extent that people would be
“satisﬁed to huddle in tiny igloos and subsist on a simple diet of meat and
blubber”.37 Despite these struggles over what constituted “professional” science – a
struggle throughout the early 1900s that transcended these two men – Anderson did
not disagree with Stefansson’s description of potential resources in the north. He
admitted to relatives that Stefansson’s plan to introduce reindeer showed the
“tangible useful results of several years of Arctic travel”.38
What Anderson was more concerned with was the model of development that
Stefansson promoted – a mixture of settler colonialism and corporate capitalism. In
a letter to his father, Anderson suspected that part of Stefansson’s motivation had
more to do with capitalists in Alaska wanting to grow their business.39 Anderson
was acutely aware of the ways Inuit in the Mackenzie Delta, many of whom he
employed in his scientiﬁc work, were developing the fur trade to the Arctic coast
and islands, tying their livelihoods even more closely to ﬂuctuations in fox popula-
tions and global markets. He wanted government scientists to steer development in
the Canadian north, preferring the approach taken by Denmark in Greenland, where
colonial ofﬁcials controlled exploration through a scientiﬁc licensing programme
and dispatched state agents who held “the utmost rigid moral and physical qualiﬁca-
tions”.40 All of Stefansson’s New North statements – and those from folks who
disagreed with him – shared two familiar traits: they expressed a fascination with
modernity and a yearning for social order; and they coupled dispassionate
description with place-promotional prescription.
In contrast, the third New North was ushered in by technological and geopoliti-
cal developments that required little self-promotion. By the mid-1940s, the demands
of the Second World War had laid bare the vulnerability of the northwestern corner
of the continent and laid the foundation for its rapid industrialization. Observers
again argued that such changes signalled another New North. Canadian geographer
Trevor Lloyd’s “New North” treatise ﬂowed from renewed commitments to conti-
nental security in the sub-Arctic, particularly in the swath of country between Fair-
banks, Whitehorse and Norman Wells. Canadian and US military agencies – along
36This quotation comes from an interview Stefansson gave to the Christian Science Monitor
in May of 1919. A clipping from this publication can be found in Rudolph Martin Anderson
fonds, MG30 40 10, File 10: CAE: Misc Memoranda, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa,
Canada (Hereafter as “LAC”).
37For the “peerless leader” comment, see Letter from RM Anderson to J.J. O’Neill, Decem-
ber 12, 1928, J.J. O’Neill fonds, MG 30 B 171, 5, File 5. Quotation from an interview RM
Anderson gave to “a representative of the press,” the contents of which can be found in
Rudolph Martin Anderson fonds, MG30 40 10, File 12, LAC.
38Letter from Anderson to J.H. Brownlee, 1919 (no month or day), MG30 40, 3, File: Corre-
spondence, 1919, LAC.
39Letter from Anderson to J.E. Anderson, November 14, 1919, MG30 40, 3, File: Corre-
spondence, 1919, LAC.
40This quotation is from the Ottawa Citizen, “Denmark Conducting Unique Experiment,”
May 3, 1924, found in Rudolph Martin Anderson Fonds, MG 30 B 40, 26, File 3: Clip-
pings, 1921–1923.
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with the private joint venture Bechtel-Price-Callahan and Standard Oil’s subsidiary,
Imperial Oil – erected a series of infrastructure projects on the frozen earth in less
than two years. The Canadian Oil (CANOL) pipeline and road, the Alaskan
Highway, a string of airﬁelds alongside them (the Northwest Staging Route), and a
constellation of weather stations rendered the New North a marker of an emerging
world order.41 As Lloyd surmised for readers of the journal International Affairs in
1944, “Now there are no longer any remote lands, soon there will no longer be
unfamiliar peoples … Internationalism is no longer something that one favours or
dislikes. It has happened”.42
Where Cameron and Stefansson had suggested the North was over-studied and
misunderstood, Lloyd contended the North was unknown. “What do we know
about Northern Canada?”, he asked, “Remarkably little!”43 Such a position
highlights how expectations for knowledge production had shifted from the Lin-
nean impulse of classiﬁcation in the mid-1800s, to debates between professional
and amateurs in the early 1900s, and to the demands placed on scientists and
engineers during the Second World War. Military ofﬁcials required information on
permafrost, the frozen-yet-fragile land upon which transportation projects had to
be built, and about the climatic and environmental conditions that might impede
the mobility and capabilities of ground forces. Defence, which had always been a
“natural” feature of the notoriously foreboding region, was now a scientiﬁc
problem.
Responding to these needs, New North authors from the 1940s began to lament
that the Canadian and Alaskan hinterlands had been previously neglected, by scien-
tists and by the state. Lloyd was an instigator in the creation of the Arctic Institute
of North America, a bi-national agency that worked through nascent governmental
laboratories – like the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory outside of Barrow, Alaska
– and through contracts with university scholars to generate research on a range of
biological, physiological, geological and ecological questions about the North.44
But for many, there was no amount of data collection that could turn back time.
Looking forward in the New North meant coming to terms with the shocking colli-
sion of a primitive people and modern society. Lloyd summed it up in a statement
worth quoting at length:
Into this rather backward, and in many ways primitive society, war came with particu-
lar force. Accustomed to neglect, the people of the north, especially the northwest,
suddenly found themselves among crowds of contractors’ laborers, thousands of troops
and more elaborate mechanical equipment than they had dreamed could exist. They
had been without adequate trails. Now they found themselves supplied with a military
41See Kenneth S. Coates and William R. Morrison, “Soldier-Workers: The US Army Corps
of Engineers and the Northwest Defense Projects, 1942–1946,” Paciﬁc Historical Review,
62, no. 3 (August, 1993), 273–304.
42Trevor Lloyd, “The New North,” Canadian Affairs, 1, no. 3 (February 15, 194), 4.
43Ibid., 5.
44John C. Reed and Andreas G. Ronhovde, Arctic Laboratory: A History (1947–1966) of the
Naval Arctic Research Laboratory at Point Barrow, Alaska, prepared under Ofﬁce of Naval
Research contract N00014-70-A-0219-0001, published by the Arctic Institute of North Amer-
ica, 1967, 3–6 and 32–40. See also Robert MacDonald, “Challenges and Accomplishments: A
Celebration of the Arctic Institute of North America,” Arctic 58, no. 4 (December, 2006),
440–51.
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road. Their rivers had heard for years the painful thrash of stern wheel steamers built
a generation ago. Now they became highways of commerce used by large and power-
ful diesel tugs and strings of newly built barges.45
For New North writers, regret for the past was inseparable from hope for the future
– one could not exist without the other.46 Only by interpreting history as something
to mourn, could one argue forcefully for correcting past trajectories and implement-
ing future possibilities.47 We have already seen this play out with Cameron’s dis-
missal of British Empire and Stefansson’s frustration over the ignorance about the
North across civilizations and throughout time. By the 1940s, this rhetorical com-
mitment required New North writers to diagnose New World forms of colonialism
as a problem – to a certain extent. Lloyd reckoned that the Canadian government
had looked after the Inuit “in a half-hearted and hesitant manner”. “As a result”, he
continued, “there has been some exploitation by white men; there is disease, neglect
and undernourishment, and no serious attempt has been made to train, for example,
the Eskimo in manual skills for which many of them are well suited”.48 Following
this diagnosis, however, was the prescription of more governmental involvement
not less. Lloyd saw only two options for moving forward with Inuit administration
– continued isolation or complete integration – and both options necessitated an
active state presence, while avoiding colonial-like behaviour. Isolation, Lloyd
decided, would take “extraordinary care, a thorough scientiﬁc study of [Inuit] ways,
money, and an informed and enlightened electorate”.49 The obvious downside to
this plan was that the natural resources on what would essentially become reserva-
tions would not be developed. On the other hand, complete integration necessitated
an even larger dose of governmental intervention. The geographer concluded,
If the far north is to be developed, co-operation of the native peoples will be needed.
Such training will take several years. A beginning should be made by choosing some
intelligent youths and attaching them as apprentices to northern air bases.
Positioning themselves between regret and hope, between the past and the future,
New North writers after the Second World War also made a space for the state as a
force for altering the path of history.50
Like Cameron and Stefansson, Lloyd projected revisions to geographical under-
standing based on changes unfolding in the northwestern corner of North America.
45Lloyd, 10.
46Grace has pointed out that the trope of neglect or forgetting within the history of Canada’s
North is a “trend of ambivalence,” of wanting to recognize a national northern identity and
regretting the inescapably of the cold, the climate, and the political boundaries. Grace, 46–7.
A similar trope is evident throughout early Alaskan historiography, especially in the writings
of C.L. Andrews and Ernest Gruening. See C.L. Andrews, The Story of Alaska, (Seattle:
Lowman and Hanford, Co., 1931).; and Ernest Gruening, The State of Alaska (New York:
Random House, 1954). Gruening’s chapter titles include “The Era of Total Neglect,” “The
Era of Mild but Unenlightened Interest,” and “The Era of Flagrant Neglect.”
47Emilie Cameron has written about emotional geographies in the Canadian Arctic in the
eighteenth century. See Emilie Cameron, “To Mourn’: Emotional Geographies and Natural
Histories in the Canadian Arctic,” in L. Bondi, L. Cameron, J. Davidson and M. Smith
(eds.) Emotion, Place, and Culture, (London: Ashgate, 2009) 163–86.
48Lloyd, 9.
49Ibid.
50Ibid.
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The aeroplane had shrunken the planet and Canada seemed to beneﬁt from this
situation. He assured readers that “In a world of transport, Canada has a strategic
location second only to the USSR”.51 Where the Arctic had been imagined as a
place-to-be-passed through, or the fringe of a continental empire made possible by
water networks, or a Polar Mediterranean, Lloyd advocated for picturing the globe
from the Arctic’s point of view. For Canadians, this perspective might be “some-
thing of a shock”. “Accustomed to thinking of ourselves as rather away from the
beaten track”, Lloyd suggested, “we ﬁnd that we are heirs to a central location in
the world of tomorrow”.52 The projection of a nationalist and northern cartography
related to Canadian anxieties that US military forces responsible for the CANOL
pipeline and Alaskan Highway might not retreat from the north and instead result
in an informal annexation of Dominion land. Lloyd made such suspicions evident
when he closed his article by warning of possible American occupations in the
subarctic.53
A fourth New North of the 1950s repeated and intensiﬁed many of these
elements from the 1940s. The location shifted to the Western Arctic coast,
where concerns about continental security spawned the creation of the Distant
Early Warning line, a chain of radar stations built every 50 miles from the
Alaska–Yukon territory border to Greenland.54 As the Second World War became
the Cold War, the absence of combat required no immediate engagement but far
more comprehensive planning. In this regard, the aeroplane provided exciting
and previously unfathomable opportunities for militarization, scientiﬁc research,
economic development and administration. As we saw in Robertson’s epigraph
at the outset of this essay, mineral industries – not those based on fur, muskox,
or reindeer – took centre stage in the mid-century New North. War- and peace-
time needs for oil, uranium, zinc, copper, iron ore and lead linked the North
with southern industrial centres, just as deposits of these same resources became
exhausted elsewhere on the globe.55 The possibilities inherent in locating and
reaching northern oil, gas and mineral reserves created a sharp break with
Norths of yore. Importantly, because non-renewable resources were of interest –
not the renewable kind – and shipment of extracted materials did not have to
contend with the freezing and thawing of rivers, nature no longer seemed a bar-
rier to northern affairs. The governor of Alaska, Ernest Gruening, banished pop-
ular concerns about an Arctic that was doomed to underdevelopment because of
its climate as “climythology”. In his “Future of the North” speech before Carle-
ton University students and faculty in Ottawa, Gordon Robertson noted that
51Ibid., 5.
52Ibid., 3–4.
53Ibid., 15.
54Matthew Farish, “Frontier Engineering: From the Globe to the Body in the Cold War Arc-
tic,” The Canadian Geographer 50, no. 2 (2006), 177–96.; David Neufeld, “Commemorat-
ing the Cold War in Canada: Considering the DEW line,” The Public Historian 20, issue 1
(1998), 9–19.
55R.G. Robertson, “The Future of the North,” a speech given before Carleton University,
1957, “Northern Development” folder, Dick Hill Collection, Inuvik Centennial Library, Inu-
vik, Northwest Territories. Robertson was optimistic for mineral development, given the
evaluation provided him by geologists: “Geologists tell us that we can expect to ﬁnd virtu-
ally every mineral except those laid down under tropical conditions.”
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northern temperatures would present an issue only if “we saw the future in
terms of growing pineapples”.56 The “frigid zone” could be reduced to a cost
factor and active governments could shoulder capital investment to pave the way
for private companies to exploit natural resources in the north.57
While the aeroplane still had to deal with environmental issues (like landing on
lakes in the winter), the appeal of technology and mineral extraction allowed
Robertson to reorganize the entire drama of the North.58 It remained a place long
forgotten and misrepresented by southern Canadians.59 But with the potential of a
New North dotted with mines and connected to the south through aircraft, the Old
North now looked more like one restricted by limits of the fur trade and water-
based transport. “The north was left to the missionaries, the fur traders, the Eski-
mos, and the Indians”, Robertson announced. Indeed, the short episodes of the
Klondike Gold Rush and war-time exploitation of bomb-making material on Great
Bear Lake indicated that minerals had determined the history of the far north all
along. Robertson suggested to listeners that “the gleam of gold or radium occasion-
ally pierced this darkness in our national mind but only for a moment”. By pitting
the New North as an answer to this history of boom and bust, Robertson implied
that the future would bring a more sustainable, if more dispersed, pattern of
development.
Because travel by air collapsed distance and time in ways the schooner and
steamer could not, the clash of “Neolithic man” and “Atomic man” became a top
priority for northern administrators in the New North of the 1950s.60 Public out-
cry over reported cases of Inuit starvation over the winter of 1953–1954 became
a national embarrassment for Canadians, tarnishing their sterling international rep-
utation for human rights.61 Civil servants and scientists deﬁned the “Eskimo prob-
lem” through the paucity of available social services, pointing repeatedly to
Alaska as a comparative case. There, the expansion of the reindeer industry dur-
ing the post-First World War era created a network of villages, initially used by
Bureau of Education teachers and Bureau of Indian Affairs ofﬁcers. This infra-
structure could be repurposed through town cooperatives, which would help local
communities pick themselves up by their own bootstraps and begin a devolution
of power to the north.62
56Robertson, 10. On “Climythology,” see Ernest Gruening, “Climythology: Ernest Gruen-
ing’s Address to the American Meteorological Society,” in Ernest Gruening, ed., An Alaskan
Reader, 1867–1967 (New York: Meredith Press, 1966), 367–72.
57There were a variety of responses to the special problems of Arctic nature in the Cold
War, from attempting to overcome the land to adapting to its natural limits. See Janet Mar-
tin-Nielsen, “The other cold war: the United States and Greenland’s ice sheet environment,
1948–1966,” Journal of Historical Geography, 38 (2012) 69–80.; and P. Whitney Lack-
enbauer and Matthew Farish, “The Cold War on Canadian Soil: Militarizing a Northern
Environment,” Environmental History 12 (October, 2007): 920–50.
58See Piper, 47–78. See also Marionne Cronin, “Shaped by the Land: The Emergence of the
Canadian Bush Plane,” http://www.niche-canada.org/node/10132 (accessed November 15,
2012.
59Robertson, 7. “The [North] was an oblivion of ice and snow and howling wind in which
no thought even o the possibility of a future entered.”
60“Symposium on the Arctic,” 135.
61Peter Clancy, “The Making of Eskimo Policy, 1952–1962: The Life and Times of the
Eskimo Affairs Committee,” Arctic 40, no. 3 (September, 1987), 191–7.
62Ibid.
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Canadian ofﬁcials bemoaned the sparse state presence in the vast northern fron-
tier, even as they looked past their own historic experiences with reindeer and
administration in the Mackenzie Delta. Continuing the trope of neglect, Robertson
wondered why previous Canadian leaders had not built “one single school, not even
a one-room school” in any location other than Yellowknife.63 His New North would
make up for past mistakes by issuing social services through family allowance pay-
ments, old age and blind pensions, hospital care for cases of tuberculosis, and edu-
cation through residential schooling and vocational training. Education became a
crucial space for converting the Old North to the New. There was “no need for an
education” to “chase a walrus or a caribou”, but such knowledge was “vital” to be
“a clerk in a mining ofﬁce or a successful carpenter”. As Stefansson had imagined
reindeer in the 1920s, Robertson saw school teachers and sociologists as helping
native northerners adjust to the “disruption of old patterns of life, old customs,
[and] old standards of value”.64 While Inuit in Alaska and Canada had known mis-
sionaries, teachers and northern police before, the arrival of hordes of doctors,
nurses, social workers, engineers and Northern Service Ofﬁcers, and the establish-
ment of entire towns dedicated to governmental administration of people and nature
(Inuvik and Frobisher Bay) indicated a New North.65
Robertson turned to history to re-imagine the state’s role in private development,
too. Taking the trope of neglect in another direction, he complained about the ways
northern resources had been laying dormant throughout the ﬁrst half the twentieth
century. “The Canadian north is one of the last great undeveloped regions on this
globe”, he announced. “There are few other parts of the world of great size that have
not been occupied – insofar as they are capable of it – and to a substantial degree
exploited”.66 As Lloyd had done with plans of isolation or integration, Robertson cre-
ated a void in the past which could only be ﬁlled by the state. Northern underdevelop-
ment was the “old story of any frontier area”: transportation facilities were too
expensive to build without a viable market for minerals, and resource exploitation
would not proceed without transportation infrastructure in place. Both US and Cana-
dian ofﬁcials called upon the public to break this “vicious circle” by investing in rail-
roads, roads and airﬁelds.67 Of course, in building support for these plans, New North
authors had to gloss over the fur trade, commercial whaling and the introduction of
reindeer to erase past traces of frontier exploitation and intervention.
In the 1970s, a ﬁfth New North appeared, reversing the drive toward centraliza-
tion apparent in the 1950s. While ofﬁcials in the US and Canada continued to
imagine government’s role as using public capital to provide the “infrastructure” for
63Robertson, 7.
64Ibid., 20–1.
65For an interesting discussion of Northern Service Ofﬁcers, their relation to the Distant
Early Warning Line construction, and change in the Western Arctic region, see David Neu-
feld, “Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line: A Preliminary Assessment of its Role and Effects
upon Northern Canada” Revised for the Arctic Institute of North America, May, 2002, 16.
Neufeld writes, “The NSO were to facilitate communications between northern construction
crews, government agencies, and native people. Basically they were to protect the interests
of the Inuit and Inuvialuit and prevent any local difﬁculties from slowing the pace of
defence construction … Hired to represent the best interests of the Inuit and Inuvialuit and
so encourage their participation in local government, the NSO were instructed to maintain
tight control over the relations between aboriginal peoples and non-natives.”
66R.G. Robertson, “The Future of the North,” 6.
67Ibid., 12–3.
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private economic development, they believed new structures and technologies could
empower Inuit to lead this development in tandem with corporate elite. This turn
toward the community was in part a reaction to decolonization in Africa, Latin
America and Southeast Asia, and observers often compared the “underdeveloped”
Arctic to these other regions.68 It also drew from the 1968 oil strike at Prudhoe
Bay, which conﬁrmed for multinational companies, ecologists and Chamber of
Commerce-types in Alberta and Alaska alike that the Arctic was best conceived of
as the “Middle North” – a reference to its similarities to the Middle East in terms
of its resource-riches and state of development.69
The Arctic Institute of North America’s 1969 conference, “Community
Development in the Middle North”, provides a window on this new New North
imaginary, and an example of how scientists became more forceful arbiters of
social, economic, political and ecological change over the last quarter of the
twentieth century. At the meeting in Hanover, New Hampshire, scientists, politi-
cians, developers and military ofﬁcials gathered to chart the future of the Insti-
tute’s involvement in northern affairs, and to make speciﬁc recommendations for
a series of conferences in the early 1970s to connect ecological research, policy
formation and economic development. Testimony from the Carrothers Commission
report of 1966 – which recommended Fort Smith as the Territorial capital of the
Northwest Territories – had indicated a desire among Inuit for an “authoritative
voice” in northern matters.70 The Institute marshalled this desire to position itself
as a clearing house for correlating and inspiring community development efforts
“to meet the speciﬁc needs and aspirations of northern peoples”. In order to do
so, it had to develop a status independent from, but connected to, government
and industry. Because of its “unusual status as a private organization” and its
“close relations with both the Canadian and US governments and with commer-
cial and academic institutions”, the Arctic Institute could prevent the “repetition
of past errors” of colonial history. The Institute also pulled from stereotypes of
native northerners to identify its role as an advocacy agency. The conference
attendees wrote, “The resident populations and traditional cultures of the North
can accomplish little except in association with enterprise, technology, and
resources from the south”.71 It seemed that empowerment in the New North
required as a prerequisite an image of northerners as powerless.
Starting in the 1970s, and arguably continuing to today, science seems to be
both the problem and the solution in New North stories. Trevor Lloyd – the geogra-
pher who articulated a vision of the New North of the immediate post-Second
World War era – gave opening remarks to conference participants on a February
morning in New England. He lamented how, over the ﬁrst half of the 1900s, gov-
ernments and scientists had developed independently of one another in the North,
such that Arctic Alaska – and knowledge about it – was separate from Arctic Can-
ada, even if the region containing these places was ecologically connected. Lloyd
68“Community Development in the Middle North: Report of a Conference Seminar, Spon-
sored by the Arctic Institute of North America,” Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, February
26, 27, 28 and March, 1, 2, A-3. This document found in the Dick Hill Collection, Inuvik
Centennial Library, Inuvik, NT.
69Ibid.
70Ibid., 3. “Galloping change is as much a feature of the North as elsewhere and this com-
pounds living problems for a small and voiceless northern population.”
71Ibid., 7–20.
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accused historical interveners with “balkanizing the North”, thus presenting the Arc-
tic Institute of North America as an agency that could “bridge these different culture
zones”. It was clear that the explosion of research activity associated with the
search for oil and gas meant that social and natural scientists penetrated all facets
of everyday life in the Arctic. One of the conference reports included, as an open-
ing epigraph, a statement from Eric Kierans, Minister of Communications: “The
average Eskimo family consists of the father and mother, ﬁve children, an aunt or
uncle, one or more grandparents, an anthropologist and a sociologist”.72
The answer, for scientists and residents of Arctic towns, was not less research in
the New North but more local control over it. Arctic Institute scientists called for
the creation of multiple task forces on subjects ranging from mineral development
to the creation of craft industries and education policy: “Local representatives
should be co-opted to the task force(s) to give an all round picture of each commu-
nity situation”.73 These sentiments were shared in the north, too, even if conference
organizers were unsuccessful in recruiting northerners to attend the meeting in the
south. In Inuvik, scientists stationed at the Inuvik Research Laboratory collaborated
with local residents to convene the Mackenzie Delta Environmental Project, a
“communication program to acquaint the residents of the Mackenzie Delta with
present government and industrial activities so that they can be more involved in
the ‘action’”. The Project was itself part of a larger community group called the
Mackenzie Institute, which brought citizens and researchers together to share
knowledge and expertise and to build capacity for development programmes.74
These institutional structures paralleled the development of the University of
Alaska-Fairbanks, and many observers in the 1960s and 1970s hoped for a similar
University of the North in Canada to act as a hybrid space for local engagement
with research, economic development and policy formation.75
72Quoted in “Man in the North Technical Paper: Communications Study/Part II Arctic Institute
of North America,” found in Dick Hill Collection, Inuvik Centennial Library, Inuvik, Canada.
73“Community Development in the Middle North: Report of a Conference Seminar, Spon-
sored by the Arctic Institute of North America,” 13.
74Rose Mary Thrasher, “Mackenzie Delta Environmental Project.”; “Introductory Prospecting
for Northerners,” and “A New Northern Educational Institute.” My sincere thanks to Dick
Hill for providing me these documents from his personal collection. See also Inuvik Drum
October 10, 1968, 3, no. 25, “Public Notice” which announced the formation of the Macken-
zie Institute and its objectives.
75Inuvik Drum, September 26, 1968, 3, no. 24. In this edition of the local paper, the editors
ran a reprint of The Canadian Forum from 1968 that is worth quoting at length: “Develop-
ment specialists have recently come to realize that information and knowledge are forms of
capital and of production. In Alaska, the booming state university located at Fairbanks con-
trasts strongly with the moribund conditions of the mining industry. Gold mining employs
150 people in the area; the University has a staff of 570. The “knowledge” industry forms a
vital and growing part of Alaska’s economy. In the summer of 1967, activities on the cam-
pus ranged from the Arctic Institute of North America’s international conference on circum-
polar health problems to a training course for sawmill operators … Although Canada prides
itself on being a northern nation, it does not yet possess a northern university … Many
“Northern” problems are similar to those in the developing countries. The lessons we can
learn in the north may have a vital part to play in understanding how man can control and
use his social and physical environment. The balance is delicate in the north, and research
there can tell us how the balance is tipping.” The University of the North did not come to
fruition, but Yukon College, Aurora College, and Ilisagvik College are all products of this
line of thinking. See Amanda Graham, “The University that Wasn’t: The University of Can-
ada North, 1970–1985,” M.A. Thesis, Lakehead University, 1994.
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While the idea of a “New North” had always involved internal tensions, the
1970s stories became quite contradictory. At a 1968 meeting of the Alaskan Sci-
ence Conference (in Whitehorse, Yukon Territory), ecologist Cowan McTaggart
described the human “appetite for energy and minerals” as unleashing untold
ecological and human consequences across the world, and potentially throughout
the north.76 Scientists pointed to these concerns to advocate for the expansion of
wilderness areas on the Beaufort Sea coast – namely to grow the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge (legislated into being in 1960) into an internationally
protected area to prevent the most-likely route for pipelines out of the region.77
Prime Minister Jean Chretien redressed ecological protection as colonialism,
because locking up the north as a sanctuary would squash Inuit aspirations for
jobs and leading roles in oil extraction. Development had become both imperial-
ism and decolonization, and conservation had become the tried and true trope of
“neglect and indifference”.78 All of these concerns informed the Arctic Institute’s
recommendations moving forward from the 1969 conference on community
development.
In a two-part technical paper released in 1971, the Arctic Institute of North
America laid out detailed plans for supporting massive communications pro-
grammes in the North to address these social and ecological dimensions of resource
exploitation. Their audience was broad, including “interested persons in industry,
government, the professions, academia, and the public at large”, but they also
attempted to speak to northern residents. Inuit leaders in the Western Arctic also
turned to radio broadcasting, local newspapers, television programmes and research
collaboratives to circulate concerns about political representation, ecological protec-
tion, and their desire to administer sustainable economic development.79 Inuit
voices were as diverse as any other, however – some northern residents wanted
control of their own land and the resources in it; others were ﬁne to let oil compa-
nies in as long as they did not interfere with trapping; and still others offered dia-
tribes against the wholesale destruction of wildlife, the tundra and the ocean, signs
76“19th Alaskan Science Conference at Whitehorse, Yukon Territory, Canada, August 26–30,
1968” printed by the Alaska Division of the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, 7–8. Found in Dick Hill Collection, Inuvik Centennial Library, Inuvik, Canada.
77University of California, “George Collins: The Art and Politics of Park Panning and Pres-
ervation: An Interview,” Regional Oral History Ofﬁce, Bancroft Library, 1980, 215–25.
78Jean Chretien, “Plain Talk on Northern Development,” a speech given before the Inuvik
Chamber of Commerce, June 1972, Dick Hill Collection, Inuvik Centennial Library. “It has
become fashionable in some southern circles to call for a freeze on northern development
for two, three or ﬁve years while southerners think out what they believe would be a better
northern future. Those I call the “Toronto-Montreal Professional Northerners” would halt
development of jobs and futures for all of you here … A freeze in this vast land would be a
return to the days of neglect and indifference. It would make it impossible to achieve our
national goals in the North. It would thrust northerners back into a new Dark Age.” 4.
79A recent speech before the Inuit Studies Conference by Nellie Cournoyea, current Chair
and CEO of the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, makes clear the role of northern communi-
cations programs in building community political engagement. See Nellie Cournoyea,
“Adaptation and Resilience: The Inuvialuit Story,” a speech before the 18th Inuit Studies
Conference, Washington, DC, October 26, 2012. See also Natasha Lyons, “Inuvialuit Rising:
The Evolution of Inuvialuit Identity in the Modern Era,” Alaska Journal of Anthropology, 7,
no. 2, (2009), 71–3.
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of which were already evident through seismic exploration in the 1950s and
1960s.80 Southerners often pointed to a changing, unstable northern environment,
whether social or natural, as a cause for concern about cultural loss. These concerns
were inﬂamed when northerners described the possibility that oil development
might weaken cultural traditions. But, as Paul Sabin has noted, for Inuit, Dene and
Metis residents in the Mackenzie Delta during the 1970s, “tradition” did not refer
to
a preserved specimen from the ancient past, but rather a way of life that had evolved
in concert with the fur trade, missions, mines, and transportation infrastructure. Just
because these people lived in history, however, did not condemn them to be victims
of it.
By the time sweeping land-claims decisions redrew lines of jurisdiction in Arctic
Alaska and Canada, the region’s future had been caricatured into winner-take-all
choices between environmental conservation and economic development, industriali-
zation and cultural preservation.81
The Old North at play in the New North of the 1970s echoed the legacies of
British imperialism Cameron appealed to in 1910. Now, continental empires marked
by western expansion were fading into the past, just as overseas empires had given
way to Cameron’s Belts of Fur and Wheat. At the conference on community devel-
opment, participants dismissed the history of “ﬁlling up” the prairies that allowed
both the USA and Canada to become powerful nations. The North of the future
would not be found distributed along the westward-marching line of the rural fron-
tier, but concentrated in urban areas.82 This was not a simple repetition of Lloyd or
Robertson’s visions of the North in the world of air travel. In the 1970s, a tightly
focused and urbanized development scheme was a response to the end of colonial-
ism. Working with northern communities was a means of avoiding “past errors”
and making good on a century of neglect. Such logic increasingly aligned the Arc-
tic with the Tropics in a post-colonial geography of development. “Urban-industrial
society which has extended its long shadow over tropical Africa, Latin America,
and Southeast Asia shows signs of doing the same in the North”, the Arctic Insti-
tute cautioned in its ﬁnal conference report. “The problems there are going to be
similar, and so must be the solutions”.83 Once again, Old and New Norths
reinforced one another as the Arctic took its seat on a shufﬂing world stage.
Conclusion: history, geography and knowledge in the New North
While each of its iterations has been unique, the common forces in the New North
are enduring as they are transformative. Technology, capital, science and state power
80Peter Usher’s interviews with Western Arctic Inuit in 1973 and 1974 provide a great indi-
cation of the variety of opinions on oil development. See Peter Usher, “Notes on inter-
views,” on ﬁle at the Inuvialuit Cultural Resource Center, Inuvik Northwest Territories, File
E 99 INT, accessed January 27, 2011. See also Paul Sabin, “Voices from the Hydrocarbon
Frontier: Canada’s Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry (1974–1977),” Environmental History
Review 19, no. 1 (Spring, 1995), 17–48.
81Sabin, 17–48.
82“Community Development in the Middle North: Report of a Conference Seminar, Spon-
sored by the Arctic Institute of North America,” A-4.
83Ibid., A-3.
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have repeatedly come together to create and recreate the North over time. From the
steamer to satellites, from whale oil to petroleum, from turning against the British
Empire to decolonizing North America – these forces have overhauled relationships
between people and nature. But New North narratives do not just observe change;
they attempt to structure and direct it. To make sense of and manage a metamorphos-
ing place, New North authors situated what ﬁrst appeared as uncharacteristic regional
phenomena as something more recognizable: change in the North was an echo or
effect of a longer stream of time and a broader web of social relations. Such appeals
to history and geography always depended on the New North storyteller, but they all
intended to sanction outsiders’ interventions in a land that did not belong to them.
The deployment of the adjective “new” in these stories reﬂects an embedded view
of the northern frontier as culturally, ecologically and historically “exceptional,” or as
somehow shielded from the rest of the world in space and time.84 When conservation-
ists, ecologists and other members of the Arctic Institute of North America worried
about the expansion of oil economies in Alaska and north west Canada into a “New”
Arctic in the 1970s, for example, their concern was invigorated by their perception
that northern communities lived in “close contact” with the surrounding environment.
Here, as in many other instances, an Old North had been called into being as a foil for
imaginations of the future.85 The presumptions of difference at this moment were
threefold: southerners did not live so closely to nature; the north had not arrived on
the stage of modern history because its residents had not yet transcended natural
limits; and southern nature can be sufﬁciently distinguished from northern nature.
Without these common-sense ideologies at play, this observation, like others in the
century of New North stories, would be a non-starter rather than a point for interven-
tion. As Sherrill Grace and Joseph E. Taylor III have argued, then, stories like the
New North tell us as much about the people who tell them – their social status, their
epistemologies, how they deﬁne the north, and how they understand history – as they
do about the day-to-day complexities of the circumpolar world.86
Readings of history often created paradoxes in the New North. Consider the argu-
ments made between 1910 and 1971 about sovereignty. In order to assert that the
Arctic was being claimed successfully in the present, authors had to construe past
attempts as failures. Agnes Deans Cameron condemned British imperialism just as
Lloyd and Robertson showed regret at mid-century for Canada’s stunted northward
84As historian Joseph E. Taylor III argued, “Similar forces affect many places, yet nobody
else talks of a New New England, New Amazon, or New Nepal.” See Taylor, 155–65. For
an insightful read on the place of “exceptional” discourse in a contemporary Arctic Alaskan
case, see Josslyn Cassady, “State Calculations of Cultural Survival in Environmental Risk
Assessment: Consequences for Alaska Natives,” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 24, Issue
4, (2010) 451–71. Alun Anderson discusses how it is time to consider the Arctic as a
“region unto itself” and also worries about the consequences of this line of thinking. “By
writing about the Arctic as a region, though, I don’t want to reinforce the notion of its being
a separate, distant, remote place. Nothing could be further from reality; the Arctic is ever
more entangled with the south and ever more at the mercy of decisions made elsewhere,
often without the slightest consideration for the top of the world.” Anderson, 9.
85Grace, 16–7. Grace writes, “True of any discursive formation, the North that is deadly,
cold, barren, lifeless, isolated, mysterious, which allowed for the playing out of heroic mas-
culinity and victorious southern technology also contains its opposite – the North of sublime
beauty, abundance, natural resources, waiting to be exploited and of great spiritual power –
because discursive formations exits by negating or subsuming what it is not.”
86Taylor, 155–65. Grace, 266–7. Grace calls this a “politics of location,” because where one
sits in space and time determines their view of the North.
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expansion in the early twentieth century. In so doing, authors yoked their authority as
voices of the New North to the past. Only by erasing or defacing history, could the
Arctic be deemed new. Only by redeeming history, could New North authors make
history, and enshrine themselves and their hopes for the north on the historical
record.87
This paradox extends to the geographies of the New North as well. In imagin-
ing a place that did not yet exist, or was on the verge of coming into existence,
New North authors often relied on existing geographical regions, concepts, or
relations. Even as the Arctic was being rendered anew through political, eco-
nomic, ecological or cultural change, these unusual changes could be understood
by readers through the example of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Great
Lakes, or Tropical Africa. In order to rescue the Arctic from obscurity and dem-
onstrate its position on the leading edge of global change, New North authors
were often forced to allude to the region’s connections to history and the planet
as we have thus far known it.
These relations with history and geography are the scaffolding upon which the
newest New North is hung, too. Dissections of the New North of today (and tomor-
row) have entrenched the notion of the Arctic-as-exotic to provide a cautionary tale
about how the world will someday look. If the North is changing, so must the earth,
they say. These tendencies have ﬁlled the New North with even more paradoxes
about the past and the future, about nature and culture and about south and north. If
urbanization at home had inspired pastoral dreams abroad in the interwar period, the
post-Prudhoe and post-land claims North has fuelled obsessions with climate
change’s impacts in a seemingly untouched northern zone. In the potent symbol of
the polar bear stranded on an ice ﬂoe – invoked by Al Gore, and emblazoned on the
cover of Alun Anderson’s book – we see how global warming threatens to destabi-
lize an already fragile ecosystem. But, we also see why contemporary Americans and
Canadians tend to think of the Arctic as an unpeopled wilderness.88 For its full
effect, the newest New North requires an Old North that is a remote and unchanging
place. Because scientists frame the Arctic as outside of modernity, they can treat its
so-called pristine environment as a baseline for measuring climate-induced change.
Because bureaucrats and businessmen portray the Arctic as experiencing globaliza-
tion for the ﬁrst time, they can label the arrival of oil companies as the dawn of a
new era.
At the same time, the newest New North contains themes that remove history
more subtly. In his prediction of the world in 2050, geographer Laurence Smith
provides the clearest example of a global Arctic commanded by its local residents.
Smith shows how citizens across the world will abandon ﬂooded coastal cities and
underperforming farms in the south to ﬁnd open land in the north.89 There, Inuit
and First Nations communities will negotiate the terms of development and land
87D. Graham Burnett has made similar claims for the authority of British explorers. See D.
Graham Burnett, Masters of all they surveyed: exploration, geography, and a British El Dor-
ado, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 25–66. Burnett writes, “taking posses-
sion always implied a previous lack of possession.”
88Anderson notes this in his introduction: “All too often, the city folk down south forget that
the Arctic is a peopled place, and are unaware of how its inhabitants live. That can lead to
some serious misunderstandings, few echoes of which reach the south.” Alun Anderson,
After the Ice, 7.
89Smith, The New North, 5–20.
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use, given the existing land-claims agreements in northern North America. In this
case, changes in the future turn historical decisions about jurisdiction and indige-
nous rights into mechanisms for redeeming a deeper history of colonialism.90 But,
in order for such projections to have meaning, readers must imagine that colonial
experience differently than New North authors have throughout the twentieth
century. Cameron, Stefansson, Lloyd, Robertson and members of the Arctic Institute
of North America described attempts at colonizing that either failed, remained con-
centrated in particular areas, involved signiﬁcant negotiation with local communi-
ties, or were thwarted by a hostile nature. For Smith’s future to appear startling or
refreshing, the past needs to be written as winner’s history in the strict dichotomies
of colonizers and colonized, leaving little room for middle ground, grey area, or
complex understandings of colonial encounters.
In addition to history and geography, knowledge is clearly at issue in Anderson
and Smith’s New Norths. The role of science in the newest New North should not
surprise us, because the story’s appeal to originality takes some of its purchase from
shifting scientiﬁc practices and applications. When scientists looked north in the late
1800s, they saw a ﬁeld of knowledge that was over-studied. By the interwar era,
the North was misunderstood. In the 1970s, all scientiﬁc data that had been col-
lected to that point were misguided. Today, Anderson, a research biologist, suggests
the International Polar Year has produced an unprecedented amount of research that
remains unsynthesized.91
These views of Arctic science reﬂect the creation of new conceptual and techno-
logical tools that rendered the far north a frontier for knowledge, a place of exception
for scientiﬁc communities the world over. The aeroplane, for example, provided the
basis for photo-mapping practices which allowed the disciplines of geology, geogra-
phy, botany and ecology to extend a different set of research questions to northern
terrain.92 As a result, the north appeared as new ground. Changes in knowledge pro-
duction were (and are) not always internally guided – they are connected to goals for
development. When scientists conceived of the Arctic as a void that could be ﬁlled
by more (or more efﬁcient) study, they repeated what others had done with Arctic
history and geography: they sought to apprehend the region so as to license their
90There are indications that elements of Smith’s predictions are already afoot. As Bob Reiss
illustrates, Alaskan Inupiat, led by former mayor of the North Slope Borough Edward Itta, are
working with Shell Oil, the state, and federal government in the US to ﬁnd a path toward sus-
tainable development of north slope oil reserves. See Reiss, The Eskimo and the Oil Man, 1–
23. In Greenland, the arrival of Big Oil is a harbinger of economic independence and self-rule,
not capitalist invasion and native resistance. See Kirsten Thisted, “Inuit without Igloos: Docu-
menting the Arctic Transition” 18th Inuit Studies Conference, Washington, DC, October 25,
2012. At a recent International Polar Year conference, Inuvialuit leaders called on scientists to
provide more data on the ecological and social impacts of development so that they could
design more sustainable extraction programs. Bob Simpson, “Inuvialuit Research Agenda,”
presentation before the NWT International Polar Year Results Conference, January 20, 2011.
91Alun Anderson, After the Ice, 9. “Nothing has driven the circumpolar view forward more
than the International Polar Year that lasted until the spring of 2009. Thousands of scientists
– natural and social – tackled the myriad issues that are needed to form a big picture of the
Arctic. My worry now is not that too little is known, but that so much is known which has
not been synthesized.”
92Both Liza Piper and Stephen Bocking have made similar claims for the subarctic and the
Cold War Arctic. See Liza Piper, 32–58; and Stephen Bocking, “A Disciplined Geography:
Aviation, Science, and the Cold War in Northern Canada, 1945–1960,” Technology and Cul-
ture, 50, no. 2, (April, 2009), 265–90.
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authority over it. This is nowhere more evident than in mid-century concerns about
permafrost (and the lack of scientiﬁc understanding of it) as an obstacle to the goal of
constructing governmental hubs and oil facilities on the frozen earth. As Ricardo D.
Salvatore has argued in the Latin American context, the recurrence of enunciations
concerning the “very possibility of knowing” the frontier became a strategy for legiti-
mizing bureaucratic, corporate and academic interventions in foreign lands. A similar
role seems clear for Arctic science in northern empires.93
The latest New North authors show great sensitivities to the landscape of his-
tory, geography and knowledge in the Arctic of today and tomorrow. In other ven-
ues, however, Inuit agency is being unduly contained through New North discourse
and practices, especially as they relate to science. In her recent survey of the
“human dimensions of climate change” literature, geographer Emilie Cameron has
convincingly shown that histories of colonialism are obscured and overlooked,
while indigenous actors are relegated as local bystanders and research consultants,
blocking opportunities for seats at the decision-making table.94 At meetings of the
Arctic Council in 2011, Mary Simon and Inuit Circumpolar Council president
Duane Smith announced that Inuit voices were being “marginalized” in discussions
of the intergovernmental group, primarily because the Secretariat for Inuit was
underfunded and overloaded with scientiﬁc grey literature, leaving Inuit leaders
incapable of balancing a scientiﬁc-technocratic view of the region with their own
views, comments and critiques. This is ironic, given that Simon helped create the
Arctic Council and this body has been instrumental in catalyzing international
attention to climate change.95
In 2009, geographer Michael Bravo openly wondered why historians had been
“so silent on the recent politics of climate change?”96 In this essay, I have raised a
voice about the New North stories deployed to understand Arctic change over the
last century, from the arrival of commercial whalers to rapid warming occurring at
high latitudes. As it was for Agnes Deans Cameron in 1910, the New North
remains today a powerful trope for redrawing lines between north and south, and
east and west. In bridging the actual and the potential, New North storytellers create
a rhetorical space where it is possible to deﬁne and redeﬁne, to ﬁx and loosen the
Arctic. At their worst, these stories presented the Arctic as a vacuum, eliding colo-
nial histories to authorize the continued exploitation of nature and labour. At their
best, these narratives confronted previous injustices to redistribute power and wealth
more equally between southern institutions and northern communities.
93Ricardo D. Salvatore, “The Enterprise of Knowledge: Representational Machines of Infor-
mal Empire,” in Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherin C. Legrand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, eds.,
Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of US-Latin American Relations,
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 90. On the role of science in northern empire, see
Richard C. Powell, “‘The rigours of an arctic experiment’: the precarious authority of ﬁeld
practices in the Canadian High Arctic, 1958–1970” Environment and Planning A 39 (2007)
1794–1811; and Peter Kulchyski and Frank Tester, Kiumajut (Talking Back): Game Manage-
ment and Inuit Rights,1900–1970, (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2007).
94Emilie S. Cameron, “Securing Indigenous politics: A critique of the vulnerability and
adaptation approach to the human dimensions of climate change in the Canadian Arctic,”
Global Environmental Change 22 (2012): 103–14.
95Becky Rynor, “Indigenous voices ‘marginalized’ at Arctic Council: Inuit Leaders,”
http://www.ipolitics.ca/2011/11/07/indigenous-voices-marginalized-at-arctic-council-inuit-lead-
ers/ (accessed November 15, 2012).
96Bravo, 264.
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There is no doubt that an open ocean, melted permafrost, altered seasons and
unpredictable migrations present unconventional ecological conditions in the Arctic.
But, if history is any guide, it will be science, state power, capital and technology –
and New North stories themselves – that shape the lasting response to climate
change. For these reasons, our scholarly hackles should rise anytime we see the
word “new” in front of “north” – not just because it signals unexpected and unfa-
miliar dimensions of Arctic life, or because it ﬂags a bid to seize authority on
northern matters, but because it puts history and geography at stake in our future.
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